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Rethinking Judicialization: Towards a Better Empirical Model
Abstract
Since World War II, scholarly examination of countries in nearly every corner of the map has discovered the
rampant growth of the power of judges and courts. I contend that this growth has been overstated by a
tradition of recent scholarship that has at times demonstrated the tendency to brand courts as powerful
prematurely. This fundamental error is the result of two chief difficulties. First, we have yet to arrive at a
universally accepted definition of judicial power, which, in turn, contributes to the second problem: the
inadequate number of reliable and universally applicable metrics of judicial power. The aim of this essay is to
introduce a new way of thinking about the power of courts from the first premises—what constitutes
power—to our ultimate goal—the models we employ to explain its development. I attempt to accomplish this
renovation in two primary ways. First, I introduce a new definition of judicial power that, at its heart, focuses
on the persistence of power over time. Second, I present key revisions to the extant judicialization frameworks
by merging the prevailing theories into a single hypothesis that emphasizes the development of judicial power
as a function of the spread of liberal democracy. Finally, I apply my framework and test empowerment
hypotheses in an empirical examination of Mexico.
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Since World War II, scholarly examination of countries in nearly every corner of 
the map has discovered the rampant growth of the power of judges and courts.  I contend 
that this growth has been overstated by a tradition of recent scholarship that has at times 
demonstrated the tendency to brand courts as powerful prematurely.  This fundamental 
error is the result of two chief difficulties.  First, we have yet to arrive at a universally 
accepted definition of judicial power, which, in turn, contributes to the second problem: 
the inadequate number of reliable and universally applicable metrics of judicial power.  
The aim of this essay is to introduce a new way of thinking about the power of courts 
from the first premises—what constitutes power—to our ultimate goal—the models we 
employ to explain its development.  I attempt to accomplish this renovation in two 
primary ways.  First, I introduce a new definition of judicial power that, at its heart, 
focuses on the persistence of power over time.  Second, I present key revisions to the 
extant judicialization frameworks by merging the prevailing theories into a single 
hypothesis that emphasizes the development of judicial power as a function of the spread 
of liberal democracy.  Finally, I apply my framework and test empowerment hypotheses 
in an empirical examination of Mexico. 
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Introduction 
 There is a phenomenon sweeping through hallowed courtrooms and vaunted halls 
of justice the world over: “the expansion of judicial power” (Tate and Vallinder 1995).  
Examination of countries in nearly every corner of the map has discovered the apparent 
rampant growth of the power of judges and courts, prompting scholars to consider its 
implications.  Some condemn mounting judicial power as an invasive evil creeping onto 
the bench and donning the robes of esteemed judges, undermining democratic legitimacy 
and acting as a countermajoritarian menace.  Others have embraced the trend as a catalyst 
for democracy and the promotion of democratic ideals.  Despite the importance of this 
debate, the aim of this essay is not to mediate the normative discussion concerning 
judicial power.  Rather, it is to work towards a better empirical understanding of judicial 
empowerment.  What is it? How do we explain its rapid growth?  How can we predict its 
future? 
Many scholars agree that judicial power has expanded at a torrid pace—so much 
so that some of the most crucial questions have gone overlooked.  For one, is judicial 
power actually spreading or is that merely a perception?  There has been an undeniable, 
visible growth of judicial power around the globe since the Second World War, but I 
contend that this growth has been overstated by a tradition of recent scholarship that has 
at times demonstrated the tendency to brand courts as powerful prematurely.  This 
fundamental error is the result of two chief difficulties.  First, we have yet to arrive at a 
universally accepted definition of judicial power, which, in turn, contributes to the second 
problem: the inadequate number of reliable and universally applicable metrics of judicial 
power. 
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 In addition to discrepancies about the (figurative) constitution of judicial power, 
there are gaps in how the dissemination of that power has been explained.  When it 
comes to mapping the spread of judicial power empirically, comparative public law 
scholarship is split into two overarching theoretical camps: the structural-institutional 
model and the cultural-ideational model.  While not without merit, I believe this 
dichotomous framework no longer adequately explains the rise of judicial power—as 
understood by the definition I will provide shortly—in light of the burgeoning empirical 
work that has been done throughout the world in a variety of settings. 
 The aim of this essay is to introduce a new way of thinking about the power of 
courts from the first premises—what constitutes power—to our ultimate goal—the 
models we employ to explain its development.  I intend to accomplish this renovation by 
presenting key revisions to the principal prevailing judicialization frameworks.  I develop 
this by first reviewing various definitions of judicial power and traditional empowering 
factors before arriving at a new definition that focuses, at its heart, on the persistence of 
power over time.  Second, I examine the explanations existing literature has provided for 
the empowerment phenomenon.  Third, I briefly discuss the flaws in the literature before 
presenting a new model that emphasizes widespread judicial empowerment as a function 
of the growth of liberal democracy.  Fourth, I apply my persistence of power framework 
and test my liberal democracy empowerment hypothesis in an empirical examination of 





I.  What is Judicial Power, Anyway? 
 One should not be fooled by the imaginative nomenclature that has accompanied 
the expansion of judicial power.  While inventive terminology like “judicialization” (Tate 
and Vallinder, 1995), “governing with judges” (Stone Sweet, 2000), “courtocracy” 
(Schepple, 2002) and even the bristling “juristocracy” (Hirschl, 2004) each carries a 
unique connotation, they all refer to the same basic phenomenon: a growing trend 
towards stronger courts.1  Yet much more difficult than coining these colorful monikers is 
determining exactly what they purport to describe.  As yet, there is no conclusive 
understanding of judicial power.  This is because the power of courts—regardless of the 
name it masquerades under—is remarkably challenging to measure.  As Ginsburg (2008, 
94) notes, there are an inadequate number of reliable and universally applicable metrics 
with which to study courts.  Our ability to generalize is further hampered by the unique 
context in which each tribunal acts.  Different political landscapes elicit different 
responses from the same type of political actors, and the courts are no exception.  
We may look to any number of sources for direction in categorizing judicial 
power.  Ferejohn (2002, 41) finds judicialization in the “increasingly important, 
pervasive, and direct role that courts play in making policy.”  The Filipino Constitution 
explicitly employs a substantive notion in its definition: “judicial power includes the duty 
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally 
demandable and enforceable” (Pangalangan, 2009, 318).  But I find Ginsburg’s results-
oriented definition (2003, 252) to be most useful: “[judicial power is] the independent 
input of the court in producing politically significant outcomes that are complied with by 
                                                 
1 Going forward, I will use many of these terms interchangeably to refer to judicial power. 
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other actors.”2  He uses outcomes to identify three specific criteria critical to cementing 
real power for a court: judicial independence from other branches; the discretion to 
render politically significant rulings; and the enforcement of and compliance with those 
decisions on the part of other political actors.3  Independence is essential so that the court 
is not constrained by subservience to the regime or other political actors.  Politically 
relevant decisions are key because even an independent court must be able to exercise 
power meaningfully on important matters, without which it would serve as just another 
paper-filing arm of the bureaucracy.  Compliance with court rulings by other political 
actors not only legitimizes judicial authority but also ensures the enforcement of court 
policy in everyday life. 
To these three criteria I would add one more to complete the power picture: the 
persistence of power over time.  This is a critical addendum: the ability of a court to 
sustain its power for a period of years rather than months distinguishes the pretenders 
from the truly powerful.  The timing component of judicial power is itself difficult to 
measure.  In this essay, I will consider the power of a court to have persisted if the court 
has issued at least 3 significant rulings in the first 10 years following its empowerment 
moment.  Rulings are significant when they address politically contentious issues, 
directly depart from the entrenched political status quo, and prove their import in the 
public psyche by drawing national media attention.4  Of course, some courts will progress 
                                                 
2 Ginsburg considers a court that demonstrates all three of these components at once to be in a 
state of “high equilibrium” (74). 
3 Finkel (2004, 779) echoes Ginsburg conceptually using alternative terminology: “judicial 
power…encompasses three interconnected concepts: independence, authority, and jurisdiction.”  
In her definition, independence means the same, authority corresponds with compliance, and 
jurisdiction corresponds with political relevance. 
4 I have borrowed the criteria of national media attention from David Mayhew’s discussion of 
U.S. legislation and front-page New York Times coverage in America’s Congress: Actions in the 
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more quickly than others.  Some may hand down a cascade of landmark rulings within 
the first few years whereas others will need the full ten years to meet the three case 
persistence criterion. 
However, I do not wish to advance a binary framework in which courts are either 
dangerously powerful or pathetically weak.  Judicial power is certainly not an all-or-
nothing enterprise.  Courts may indeed exhibit varying degrees of independence, political 
significance, and outside compliance.  They may also display some of these components 
but not others.  One of the greatest challenges this scholarship faces is to differentiate 
genuine power from that which is fleeting, ephemeral, limited, or artificially contrived by 
political actor puppeteers.  As Finkel notes, “The current literature...remains weak with 
respect to its ability to evaluate the power of reformed judiciaries or to systematically 
compare them across countries” (Emphasis added. Finkel 2004, 780).  I believe 
Ginsburg’s model, revised to include my element of sustained power over time, will help 
address that challenge.  Therefore, throughout the remainder of this essay, complete 
judicial power will be understood to mean:  
“the independent input of the court in producing politically significant 
outcomes that are complied with by other actors…all of which persists 




                                                 
Public Sphere, James Madison Through Newt Gingrich. New Have, Connecticut: Yale University 
Press, 2000. 
5 Ginsburg does make a distinction between formalistic and maintained judicial power.  However, 
he does not explicitly incorporate the element of time and duration in his central definition of 
judicial power like I do here.  
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II. Mapping the Empowerment Story: Explanations for Increased Power  
 In mapping judicial power, comparative public law scholarship is split into two 
general camps of theories: the structural-institutional and the cultural-ideational.  Thus 
far, nearly all empowerment theories emphasize one or the other of these two larger 
headings, although some bridge the two, since they are not mutually exclusive.  
 
The Cultural-Ideational Model and its Components 
The cultural-ideational model is predicated on the notion that judicialization has 
expanded globally due to shared cultural conditions that have encouraged its prospect for 
growth.  Judicial power flourishes in societies with political cultures that are capable of 
promoting it.  That volition is manifested in various ways, including the demand for 
protected human rights, a mobilized legal community, and the promotion of democratic 
ideals. 
 
 The Rights Hypothesis 
The rights hypothesis emerged as one of the most prevalent frameworks from the 
beginning of judicalization scholarship.  Tracing the legal codification of human rights, 
the rights hypothesis asserts that the boom in judicial power since World War II has been 
causally related to the demand to rectify the social failures of the World War era.  
Shapiro (2002) points to the universal cry for the protection of rights in the wake of the 
gross human rights violations committed during the fascist era in Western Europe.  The 
plea was heard, and Europe institutionalized rights protection as a major function of the 
courts, followed shortly by the emergence of a global climate of concern for human 
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rights in the latter half of the 20th century.  Nascent democracies from post-Soviet Eastern 
Europe to post-dictatorship Latin America to post-Apartheid South Africa have entrusted 
their judiciaries with the guardianship of group and personal liberties in the wake of 
unspeakable rights infringements.  As the aggregate rights awareness of the international 
community has elevated, rights protection has become increasingly institutionalized in 
supranational bodies like the European Court of Justice and the European Court of 
Human Rights.  Furthermore, global responses to deteriorated political situations like 
Darfur, Yugoslavia and Iraq demonstrate the international community’s initiative to 
speak out against rights abuses and the emergence of a global legal morality.  The United 
Nations is no longer the lone whistle blower on rights violations.  International political 
elites do not hesitate to voice rights concerns directly to delinquent regimes and have 
increasingly brought war criminals to trial. 
 But why have states across the globe elected to charge their courts—as opposed 
to any other political organ—with the responsibility of safeguarding rights?  Courts make 
sense as natural guarantors of human rights because, unlike the executive and legislative 
branches of tripartite governments, courts are seldom majoritarian institutions.  Those 
that wield the juridical power are generally appointed and approved by other political 
figures, actors who often (but not always) are beholden to the electorate.  This insulates 
the judiciary from both the populace and outside politicians and allows it to manage the 
principal-actor relationship between polity and government, giving judges discretion to 
check the government on behalf of the people or less powerful groups.  Judicial 
insulation also makes the courts the safest option for resolving disputes between political 
actors.  The court’s natural political insulation gives it legitimacy as a third party dispute 
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mediator in the process of triadic dispute resolution on two levels, both vertically—in 
disputes between higher and lower levels of government—and horizontally—in disputes 
between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches (Shapiro 1981).  The end result 
is the juridical prevention of rights abuse even in the case of popularly sponsored and 
democratically conceived governmental behavior like that of the Jim Crow American 
South. 
 
Judicial Professionalism and the Legal Support Structure 
Tate (1995, 33) has asserted that, although exogenous conditions must permit 
judicial empowerment, judges themselves are ultimately responsible for cultivating 
judicial power.  Regardless of the textual mechanisms providing for theoretical power or 
favorable political conditions, it is still the judges who must actualize that potential power 
by delivering rulings and exercising their agency, thereby promoting their own power.  
Termed judicial activism, the increased proclivity of judges to invalidate legislation has 
become one of the many phenomena associated with global judicial empowerment.  Keck 
(2002) agrees that judicial attitudes and political preferences have colored the American 
judicial empowerment experience and continue to shape the state of the U.S. Supreme 
Court today.  Hilbink’s (2008) account of the Chilean judiciary’s timidity despite its 
maintenance of formal independence and the potential to assert itself during the Pinochet 
regime supports this claim as a negative proof.   
While it is certain that only judges may author the opinions that become legal 
precedent, Epp (1998) has argued that the presence of a legal support structure—
composed of lawyers, advocacy groups, and law professors, among others—is in fact the 
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most essential enabling condition for judicialization.  Rather than affecting legal change 
from the top down, Epp sees the activity of civil society and movements at the grass roots 
as instrumental to forging a new constitutional order.  The support structure may be more 
in touch with society’s cultural preferences than socially isolated, politically elitist judges 
and therefore is better suited to advance its goals.6   
   
The Structural-Institutional Model and its Components 
 As opposed to the cultural model, theories in the structural-institutional strain 
focus on political-institutional arrangements as catalysts for judicialization.  Among the 
most important of these are the diffusion of power and strategic elite behavior. 
 
The Diffusion of Power  
 Judicial power has flourished in nations where the central governing power is 
divided in the Montesquieu-ian tradition amongst multiple political institutions, branches 
and organs.  Ginsburg forcefully posits that “domestic political diffusion is a necessary 
condition for the development of judicial power” (2003, 20).  For that reason, 
authoritarian regimes—predicated on highly concentrated or unitary power—serve as 
hostile environments for the development of strong courts.  The diffusion of power theory 
does seem to explain many global instances of empowerment.  Perhaps that is why it has 
no shortage of defenders.  Shapiro (1981) sees judicialization as a likely byproduct of a 
strong tradition of federalism.  In federalist systems with multiple levels of government, 
                                                 
6 Although he does not go so far, a radical extrapolation of Epp’s hypothesis could interpret 
judicial actions and attitudes as incidental because they are mere reactions to the behavior of the 
legal support-structure that controls the legal agenda and process.  I find, however, judicial 
behavior and attitudes to be an extremely important element of judicial empowerment, as I 
explain below. 
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courts serve to mediate disputes between local and federal government in the process of 
triadic conflict resolution.  Ginsburg (2009) adds that when power is delegated to 
administrative agencies, courts assume the additional responsibilities of monitoring 
federal administrative agents and arbitrating administrative law.  Dahl (1957) asserts that 
courts derive power from the interplay between all branches in the form of inter-branch 
political coalitions.  Whittington (2007) follows this current by identifying the executive 
as the center of modern American political coalitions and the power of the court as a 
direct function of the presidential political alignment at any given moment.  Graber 
(1993) tracks the historical rise of judicial power in the United States and views the 
courts as beneficiaries of voluntarily delegated legislative power to resolve nationally 
divisive issues that are problematic for the legislative and executive branches, evidenced 
by the landmark decisions on slavery, segregation, and abortion.7  Ferejohn (2002) 
addresses this same phenomenon with his “fragmentation hypothesis,” but argues that, as 
opposed to voluntary delegation, courts seize legislative power when political gridlock in 
the normal legislative organs creates a power vacuum.  These theories all see the court’s 
power at one level or another as a function of divided, diffuse political power.  The more 
diffuse the system, the greater the potential for a powerful court. 
  
The Elite Power-seeking Model 
 Another valuable account in the structural-institutional camp is the elite power-
seeking model.  Ginsburg (2003) and Hirschl (2004) both advance models of judicial 
empowerment founded in the strategic response to waning power or the expectation 
                                                 
7 Dred Scott v. Sanford (60 U.S. 393), Brown v. Board of Education (346 U.S. 483), Roe v. Wade 
(410 U.S. 113), 
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thereof of anxious political elites.  In Ginsburg’s “insurance hypothesis,” political elites 
who are confronted with electoral uncertainty and foresee themselves being ousted from 
power are more prone to arrange a constitutional bargain in which they empower courts 
as a means of protecting and pursuing their agenda after their political removal.  Hirschl 
(2004) proposes a similar elite-driven theory of hegemonic preservation in which 
political, economic, and judicial elites all collude to create a new constitutional order that 
wrests policymaking agency away from majoritarian institutions and empowers courts.  
This occurs because elites believe their interests and agendas are more likely to be served 
by insulated judicial panels with compatible elite views than normal democratic 
processes that favor the masses.  This notion is shared in part by Smith (2009), who 
believes that power-seeking elites do benefit from judicial empowerment—perhaps more 
so than their apolitical mass counterparts—and, therefore, have settled upon proliferating 
judicialization in democratic settings as a successful means of legitimately procuring 
their goals. 
The influence of this hypothesis is supported in part by Magaloni (2008) and 
Trochev (2004) who agree that judicial empowerment is largely the work of political 
elites striving to maintain autocratic or authoritarian rule.  However, rather than elites 
who anticipate losing power, Magaloni and Trochev offer accounts of Mexico and Russia 
that focus on politicians whose political clout is secure.  Magaloni cites the PRI 
hegemonic domination in Mexico as an example where the ruling party empowered the 
courts not because it feared losing power, but because it needed to maintain vertical order 
among party members from the national level down to the regional politicians.  The 
courts in this account acted as interparty mediators and helped stabilize the regime.  
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Similarly, Trochev points to the regional courts in Russia, which were empowered by 
governors who faced no electoral threat but wanted to legitimate their autocratic power 
formally before their local electorate as well as their national political superiors.   
 As for economic elites, Hirschl’s hypothesis sees both domestic and international 
players as key in promoting their economic interests through judicial empowerment.  
Domestic white land-owning elites in South Africa managed to maintain their economic 
superiority through the installation of a democratic constitution despite the document’s 
drastic social reforms that ended Apartheid (Klug 2007, 319).  Similarly, Anwar Sadat’s 
Egypt was in desperate need of international investment after the previous regime 
expropriated foreign-owned international assets in a nationalization campaign that 
alarmed economic elites and discouraged further investment.  To jumpstart its economy 
and distinguish itself from its political predecessors, Sadat turned to Egypt’s courts to 
uphold the rule of law over property and demonstrate legal legitimacy in a successful 
effort to attract new international investors (Moustafa, 2003). 
  
III. A New Dimension: The Maturity Hypothesis 
I believe this dichotomous framework, while not without merit, does not 
adequately explain the rise of judicial power—as understood in this essay—in light of the 
burgeoning empirical work that has been done throughout the world in a variety of 
settings.  Individually, the cultural-ideational and structural-institutional models may 
explain particular components of judicial empowerment—indeed, they each do well to 
outline instances of partial empowerment.  But both structural-institutional and 
cultural-ideational factors are necessary for accounting for complete, real judicial 
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power at the national and the global levels.  The two families of factors are 
inextricably intertwined, working in concert to reinforce one another.  It is the 
simultaneous maturity within a state of factors belonging to each one of the families 
that yields true judicial power—the power defined at the outset of this paper.  That 
is why only rights-based democracies with diffuse power structures, a liberal 
economic agenda and an active judicial profession8 host genuinely powerful courts.  
 
Combining Factors 
The greatest contributor to the rise and expansion of judicial power has been the 
growth of liberal democracy.  Historically, we have seen judicialization follow the spread 
of democracy from the end of World War II through the second and third waves and the 
global decline of communism (Huntington, 1991).  During the last sixty years, the 
number of the world’s democracies has sharply increased, and along with it, instances of 
judicial power.  Domingo (2004, 2) asserts that “The judicialisation of politics is a 
phenomenon of modern democratic rule.”  Many contend that democracy is the only 
necessary condition for judicialization (Tate, 1995; Ginsburg, 2008).  I will argue that 
liberal democracy provides the only environment that simultaneously develops the 
cultural and institutional factors necessary for the realization of true judicial power.  
As a political organization, democracy is ideologically rooted in the greatest 
diffusion of power: the rule of the people.  Ginsburg and his academic predecessors have 
shown that the formal division of powers is crucial to the birth of judicialization, and 
greater diffusion breeds greater judicial power.  Liberal democracies are characterized in 
                                                 
8 Various descriptive categorizations come to mind when discussing such nations, for example, 
the welfare states or modernized polities. Although it is an imperfect classification, I will use the 
term “liberal democracies” to refer to such nations in the remainder of this essay.  
 18 
part by competitive multiparty systems, influential civil society and pressure groups, and 
an unconstrained media.  All of these exogenous sources wield power that is clearly 
manifested in the political process.  They merge with traditional sources of state power, 
which are themselves divided, to form one large power-sharing mosaic that is incredibly 
diffuse. Accordingly, liberal democracies—unlike states that repress political parties, 
media networks, and social movements or concentrate their formal power—foster the 
greatest opportunity for diffusion of power and, therefore, judicial power. 
In addition to structural factors, modern liberal democracy includes substantive 
cultural guarantees.  The term liberal democracy has come to imply an underlying culture 
of rights and rights protection, and some sort of bill of rights has become requisite in 
modern liberal democracies.  Indeed, Israeli academics argue that rights-protection is so 
fundamental that it has become a foundational block of modern democracy (Barak 2006; 
Edrey 2005).  The Philippines explicitly institutionalized court protection of rights in 
their constitution (Pangalangan 2009), as have many other nascent democracies that have 
adhered to the growing trend of adopting “thick” constitutions that contain specific 
provisions and directives for the judiciary (Schepple 2005). 
Liberal democracy has also been linked with the spread of economic liberalism.  
The market system’s encouragement of private sector economic enterprise has made it 
necessary to institutionalize individual and corporate economic rights.  Those rights, like 
human rights, require a formal guardian.  And just as with human rights, the courts have 
been charged with guarding economic rights.  Furthermore, the rule of law is necessary to 
sustain a market economy.  It is critical in ensuring predictable and fair corporate 
 19 
practices, upholding property rights, and shielding international investment from undue 
government nationalization efforts (Moustafa 2003). 
The elite framework has been touted for explaining the timing of constitutional 
revolutions (Ginsburg 2007, 91).  I concur that it does well to pinpoint the causes of the 
specific empowerment moment, but I am skeptical that elite explanations are equally 
relevant in the judicial politics of a nation going forward from the empowerment moment 
and even less so after a court has achieved the maintenance criterion.  While the 
prerogatives of political, economic, and judicial elites may be in sync at the time of 
empowerment, it is less likely that the compatibility of those elites within complex 
coalitions will endure over time.  Since political and economic landscapes constantly 
evolve, contemporary elites may no longer share the same needs or interests as their 
predecessors who initially empowered the judiciary.  In response, courts may either shift 
their allegiance from one group or type of elites to another or abandon elites to advocate 
for the masses.   
Using the United States as an instance of shifting elite beneficiaries, we see that 
the elites responsible for drafting the Constitution in 1789, promulgating the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, and handing down the Marbury decision of 1803 are nowhere to be found in 
the 21st century.  With perhaps the exception of the oil industry, domestic economic 
preeminence has shifted from land to transferable assets.  Similarly, the political elites of 
white males groomed in the English pedigree have given way to political equality 
embodied by an African-American president.  True, international economic implications 
are as important as ever in the midst of a global financial lull, but the change in “who 
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benefits” from judicial power demonstrates a clear divergence from the orientation of the 
empowerment moment. 
Not only elites benefit from empowered courts; the masses can too (Smith 2009; 
Epp 1998). Mass interests are served when marginalized groups profit from court 
decisions, particularly at the expense of groups that traditionally dominate the legal 
system.  Although elites vary from country to country and era to era, mass groups may 
include legal underdogs like indigenous peoples, the poor and uneducated, and unpopular 
religious groups.9  One indication of the masses benefitting is the increased use of the 
courts.  Underrepresented groups tend not to petition redress from courts if they do not 
believe they have a legitimate chance of being afforded remedy by them.  Another 
indication is the type of rulings handed down.  Typically, pro-mass rulings involve social 
reforms like welfare, labor, agricultural distribution, and other democracy-strengthening 
goals. 
Take the French Fifth Republic, for instance, where the Conseil Constitutionnel 
gained real power only after its empowering political elites left power—specifically, 
President Charles de Gaulle (Stone Sweet, 1992).  The Filipino Supreme Court also 
began advocating mass interests shortly after the promulgation of the Filipino 
Constitution by compensating for the majoritarian branches’ failures and “correcting the 
deficiencies of the democratic processes” (Pangalangan 2009, 324).  As I will show later, 
                                                 
9 Liberal democracies further challenge the elite theory because they tend to have developed 
economies and present greater opportunity for socio-economic mobility, blurring the lines 
between elites and masses.  For that reason I am more inclined to accept Smith’s (2009) notion of 
elites and masses through the Machiavellian framework as those who desire to rule and those who 
simply do not want to be oppressed. 
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Mexico offers two distinct historical instances in which empowerment has led to judicial 
advocacy on behalf of the masses. 
The Hungarian Court is another example of a court that sought to serve the 
interests of the masses shortly after its empowerment by elites.  In the years directly 
following the fall of the Soviet Union and Hungary’s independence, the Supreme Court 
handed down rulings defending “pensioners, poor families, people with chronic illnesses, 
pregnant women and others” (Schepple 2005, 47).  However, the Hungarian Court 
succumbed to elite political pressures not long after its empowerment, failing the 
maintenance criterion for true judicial power.  This episode demonstrates how a court 
may imperil itself and detract from its power if it too quickly abandons or threatens elite 
interests in pursuit of mass ones, explaining why court advocacy of mass interests grows 
as time passes from the empowerment moment and courts learn to stand on their own 
feet. 
Finally, the conjunctive maturation over time of all the above factors strengthens 
judicial power in a given nation.  
 
IV.  Why the Maturity Hypothesis Makes Sense: Individual Factors and the 
Incorporation of Time 
In Part I, I stressed the importance of maintenance of power over time.  Why is 
time such an important factor for judicialization?  As time passes after the constitutional 




Entrenchment of the Diffusion of Power 
As outlined earlier, in the Ginsburg, Shapiro, Whittington, Graber, Ferejohn and 
Dahl theories, diffuse power is critical to judicialization.  As time passes after the 
empowerment moment, we can expect the diffusion of power to vary, often becoming 
more entrenched.  Widner (2008) shows us that diffusion also means diverse perspectives 
within the political organs.  As a country ages, political parties within that country also 
tend to mature.  Heightened party opposition leads to more litigation and court 
policymaking, as I will demonstrate with Mexico’s three-party system in the second half 
of this paper.  The infamous United States case of Bush v. Gore10 demonstrates that party 
opposition was so contentious, the nation so ideologically divided, and both parties so 
confident in the courts that the 2000 presidential election was decided as much in the 
courtroom as in the polls. 
 After the constitutional moment, we can also usually expect a nation’s 
commitment to constitutionalism to grow.  In liberal democracies, this commitment will 
help protect and cement the autonomy of opposition parties, advocacy and pressure 
groups, and the media, all of which contribute to diffuse power arrangements and judicial 
authority. 
 
Increased Distance from Past Regimes: Developing the Rule of Law 
Not every court receives an explicit empowerment mandate at the successful 
overthrow of an authoritarian regime or imperial hegemon.  Some courts simply pass 
from one authoritarian regime to another and never become empowered at all.  In fact, 
most courts start out weak after democratization or state independence and incrementally 
                                                 
10 531 U.S. 98 
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gain power thereafter. But in the cases of courts that do experience empowerment 
moments as the result of national independence, democratic constitution writing or the 
restoration of democracy after a stretch of authoritarian rule, we can expect their power to 
grow as the new regime becomes more stable with the development of cultural factors, 
none more important than the widespread embrace of the rule of law (Stone Sweet 2000). 
Although some level of judicial autonomy and agency is possible in authoritarian 
regimes, authoritarianism is an environment hostile to fully independent, politically 
relevant judiciaries (Ginsburg and Moustafa 2008).11  As increasing distance is put 
between the current democratic and past authoritarian regimes, old authoritarian practices 
are generally exchanged for democratic ideals.  As Tate (1995) and Ginsburg and 
Mustafa (2008) have indicated, authoritarian regimes are loath to support a rule-of-law 
culture or a system of legalistic norms because they fear it will be used against them by 
opponents of the regime.  With a new constitutional order and the passage of time, the 
rule of law should take hold, facilitating judicialization. 
 
Judicial Professional Experience and the Exercise of Judicial Agency 
 It is nearly inevitable that courts will be confronted with the challenge to define 
the scope of their own power once they become empowered.  They must do so in “grand 
                                                 
11 Ginsburg and Moustafa outline the various functions of courts in authoritarian regimes vis-à-vis 
the central government.  They identify two general strategies for authoritarian leaders: either 
empower the courts or constrain them, whichever better suits the regime.  Motivating factors for 
empowerment include social control, regime legitimation (e.g. Russia), controlling administrative 
agents (e.g. Mexico), controlling the economic sphere (e.g. Egypt), and delegated power for 
controversial reforms (e.g. U.S. a-la Graber).  Courts are constrained so they cannot challenge the 
regime.  This is accomplished by imposing judicial self-restraint (e.g. Chile), a fragmented 
judicial system, limited public access to justice, and incapacitated judicial support networks.  
Regimes need to strike a careful balance so that courts are powerful enough to aid them but not 
powerful enough to topple them. 
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cases,” or the “Marbury moment” (Ginsburg, 2003, 17).12  For some, this task is simple.  
The constitution or constitutional text may explicitly spell out the jurisdiction and 
provinces of the court or its role as the supreme or compartmental interpreter of the 
constitution.13  In that case, all the court must do is reaffirm the original constitutional 
mandate.  Deferential courts may choose to cede components of their power or deny that 
it ever existed in the first place.  For others, namely those courts in polities bounded by a 
thin constitution, the scope of judicial power may be harder to clarify.  In either situation, 
the Marbury moment is a coming-of-age experience that helps a court carve out its own 
place in the greater constitutional adjudication scheme. 
Once the court defines the scope of its power, it can be more sure about the power 
that it exercises.  It may even become more willing to increase the power it has.  This is 
quantitatively demonstrated in the statistics of statutory invalidation in most countries 
with constitutional review.  As Ginsburg (2008) suggests, it may be erroneous to measure 
composite judicial strength by the sheer number of invalidations alone, but it is 
incontrovertible that an increase in statutory invalidation over time indicates an elevated 
and growing willingness of judges to exercise their agency, respond to other political 




                                                 
12  Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court John Marshall established the first instance of judicial 
review by invalidating a statute in the United States in the landmark case Marbury v. Madison (5 
U.S. 137) in 1803. 
13 The judicial branch in a given polity may be the sole interpreter of the constitution, charged 
with the exclusive right to interpret the document’s goals, aims, and mandates.  Conversely, 
constitutional interpretation may be compartmental or joint enterprise, in which the courts share 
constitutional responsibilities with one or more other branches of government. 
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Evolution of the Legal Support Structure 
 With time, the legal community that accompanies a grounded judiciary can be 
expected to grow.  Just like with judges, those involved with the legal profession—
lawyers, law professors, interest groups—will become more comfortable with their roles 
within the greater cultural and institutional framework.  Accordingly, legal procedures 
used to challenge laws and statutes will become more familiar, making the courtroom 
more effective as a policymaking forum.  In that event, challenges to laws and statutes 
can be expected to occur more frequently and with better preparation and more bite.  
Additionally, public access to courts and standing to sue may become more widespread. 
 
Expansion of Jurisdiction 
 In nascent democracies, the political agenda immediately following the founding 
constitutional moment may be crowded with exorcising the demons left behind by the 
previous regime.  In many cases, this includes bolstering property rights and neo-liberal 
economic values in an economic opening that follows the political opening.  It may also 
include the policing of corrupt officials or punishment of past tyrants, as in the 
Philippines (Pangalangan).  Furthermore, as cases accrue, precedents are set.  Stable 
jurisprudence in these areas is typically necessary before the court turns to issues of 
social justice, human rights, and welfare concerns.  Courts that attempt to take on these 
issues too early imperil themselves, as the case of Hungary demonstrated.  It took the 
United States sixty years after the establishment of review to amend the greatest rights 
controversy in the country’s history, slavery, and another hundred to enforce the new 
egalitarian provisions meaningfully. 
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V. Mid-Point Summary, Initial Conclusions 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart once famously wrote in a concurrence 
about the definition of pornography, that for all its elusiveness, “I know it when I see 
it.”14  We are unfortunately unable to say the same about judicial power.  Our recourse is 
to construct—like Justice Stewart’s Supreme Court colleagues eventually did—a rigid 
definition to help identify observable phenomena.  I believe that the current definitions of 
judicial power require clarification.  I propose the implementation of an expanded version 
of Ginsburg’s definition, in which judicial power is “the independent input of the court in 
producing politically significant outcomes that are complied with by other actors…all of 
which persists over time and can be reasonably expected to persist in the future.” 
With this definition, I believe we can distinguish instances of true judicial power 
from judicial puppetry.  While I find that judicial power is increasingly across the globe 
in a variety of contexts, the only conditions in which complete judicial power can flourish 
are nurtured in mature, liberal democracies. Although we have seen various types of 
partial empowerment stories in authoritarian contexts, it remains to be seen whether a 
court will arise that can be truly, completely powerful in a non-democratic context.   
 
VI.  An Empirical Examination: Mexican Judicialization 
 In December of 1994, Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo initiated a reform of the 
judicial system through constitutional amendment that transformed the country’s 
                                                 
14 378 U.S. 184 
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Supreme Court from an executive puppet to a functional constitutional court.15  Prior to 
the reform, the Mexican judiciary was politically dependent and operationally 
constrained, failing both the judicial independence and political relevance power criteria.  
But the Zedillo administration made judicial empowerment one of its top priorities, 
breaking from party precedent of the 71-year hegemonic Institutional Revolutionary 
Party (PRI), whose rule was generally characterized by direct judicial subordination to 
the executive (Fix-Fierro 1998; Domingo 2000; Cárdenas Gracia 2000; Finkel 2008; 
Magaloni 2008).  Ten years after Mexico’s inauguration as a legitimate electoral 
democracy and fifteen years after its historic judicial reform, this section seeks to 
determine 1) the impetus for the Zedillo administration’s decision to judicialize Mexican 
politics and 2) whether that empowerment effort has indeed created a powerful court. 
 Section A addresses the Mexican judiciary’s systemic lack of power prior to the 
1994 reform that originated from the absence of institutional independence, a legally 
limited political relevance, and an anti-political attitude that was internalized in the 
judicial profession.  Section B examines specific eras in the judiciary’s history to 
demonstrate fluctuating levels of judicial power based on the solidification of the 
principles outlined in Section A.  Section C discusses the social, political and economic 
circumstances leading to the 1994 reform.  Section D details the structural, substantive, 
and resulting attitudinal changes imposed by the 1994 reform that empowered the Court 
by imbuing it with formal independence, constitutional review, and a new judicial 
professionalism.  Section E explores the competing explanations for Zedillo’s decision to 
empower the Mexican courts.  Section F outlines the post-1994 judicial reforms that have 
                                                 
15 Cárdenas Gracia (2000) notes that the Court “was [originally] conceived more as an appeals 
rather than a constitutional court” (172). 
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contributed to and bolstered the ramifications of the 1994 empowerment moment.  
Section G discusses judicial power in the 21st century.  Section H addresses the 
contemporary impediments to the maintenance of judicial power in Mexico.  I end with a 
conclusion summarizing the findings of this section.  
 
A.  Judicial Behavior prior to 1994: Symptoms of Judicial Puppetry 
External Limits to the Court’s Power: Abridging Judicial Independence 
From 1929 until the 1994 reform orchestrated by President Ernesto Zedillo, the 
Mexican judiciary—like every other political organ—had been the puppet of the 
hegemonic ruling party, the Partido Revolucional Institucional (PRI).  Despite explicit 
mandates for the separation of powers embodied in the 1917 Mexican Constitution,16 the 
judicial branch during the PRI regime was effectively a department of the executive 
(Chaires Zaragoza 2007, 51).  This lack of independence stemmed from the fact that PRI 
rule was characterized by a phenomenon endemic to Latin America: presidencialismo 
(presidentialism), the domination of the entire political landscape by the president of the 
nation (Weldon, 1997).  In Mexico, the president was able to maintain near total control 
of the constitutional order thanks to both explicit constitutional provisions and 
unintended de facto circumstances (Magaloni 2008, Zamora 2004, Domingo 2000). 
First, the PRI was a highly synchronized hegemonic regime.  As the leader of the 
PRI, the president set the party agenda and the rest of the autocratic order adhered to it 
(Magaloni 2008; 2003).  From 1929 to 1994, the PRI perpetually held more than two-
thirds of the seats in both Congressional houses—the Senate and the Chamber of 
Deputies—as well as two-thirds of the seats in each of the thirty-two Mexican state 
                                                 
16 Title III, Article 49. 
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legislatures.  The PRI’s overwhelming electoral representation, in addition to facilitating 
effortless promulgation of regular legislation, gave the Mexican president perennial 
control of the supermajorities necessary to ratify constitutional amendments and turned 
Mexico’s formally rigid constitution into an exploitable document (Fix-Fierro 1998, 4).  
As a result, PRI presidents barreled through constitutional roadblocks and were able to 
quickly promote ambitious agendas despite the temporal limitations of the nonrenewable 
six-year term of office (sexenio).  This is evidenced by the more than 400 constitutional 
amendments ratified between 1929 and 2004 (Ansolabehere, 111).17 
Second, the judicial appointment and removal mechanisms provided the president 
the ultimate power to appoint and remove judges.  Less rigid than the amendment 
process, judicial appointment required presidential nomination with only a simple 
majority of votes from the upper house, the Senate (Senado).  Again, the PRI’s staggering 
numbers in Congress made the approval of the president’s judicial nominees little more 
than a formality (Domingo 2000, 713).  Accordingly, the president could populate the 
Supreme Court with judges sympathetic to his agenda while simultaneously maintaining 
order through the threat of judicial removal.  In turn, the members of the Supreme Court 
were charged with the administration of the entire judicial order.  The justices themselves 
appointed lower federal court members and were responsible for internal regulation 
(Finkel 2008, 91).  Because the judges of the High Court controlled the lower court 
nominations, and the party controlled the appointment of the High Court justices, the PRI 
was effectively in control of the appointment of every federal judge in Mexico.  On the 
state side, judges were appointed through nomination and confirmation in the state 
                                                 
17 By comparison, the U.S. constitution has been amended just twenty-seven times over the 
course of more than 200 years. 
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legislatures.  The PRI’s vice grip on state legislature seats resulted in its control of all the 
state judicial appointments, in addition to its command of all federal appointments. 
  The fallout was that all judges—prospective, veteran, and even those not directly 
appointed by the sitting president—were beholden to the party.  If a judge sought 
appointment, he had to earn his nomination by demonstrating obedience to party 
principles.  If he wished to retain his judgeship after ascending the bench, he had to rule 
in favor of the party or else imperil himself.  Rogue judges could be and were replaced at 
the discretion of the president with approval from the Senado (Domingo 2000, 712).  In 
fact, every president from 1954 to 2000 appointed at least 54% of the justices of Supreme 
Court (Magaloni 2008, 2003; Domingo 2000).18  Another result of constitutional 
malleability during PRI rule was fluctuations in the number of Supreme Court justices 
(changed 8 times), term length (changed 3 times), appointment and removal 
specifications (3 times), as well as the wholesale replacement of all sitting judges (2 
times) (Ansolabehere 2007, 120). 
 
Internal Limits to the Court’s Power: Curtailing Political Relevance 
Compounding the exogenous institutional constraints from the legislative and 
executive branches, judicial power was endogenously curtailed by an exceedingly limited 
subject jurisdiction, the judicial charter to apply rather than interpret the law, and an anti-
interventionist juridical-political professional preference (Finkel 2008, 91-2).  The 
combination of these impeding factors left the Mexican courts politically irrelevant. 
                                                 
18 By comparison, the average U.S. president appoints 33% of the Supreme Court (Domingo 
2000, 725). 
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Critically, the courts lacked jurisdictional authority over many salient spheres of 
jurisprudence.  Electoral and agrarian law are perhaps the two areas where the absence of 
judicial oversight had the largest implications.  Both were subject to unilateral executive 
discretion and, as a result, both were abused to advance PRI interests (Fix-Fierro 1998, 
4).  In the electoral arena, the courts were forbidden to hear challenges to the electoral 
code, the rules governing campaigning, the execution of polling, and the oversight of the 
final ballot tallying.  With no political checking organ, the PRI confidently ran “open” 
elections as a veneer of democratic legitimacy without fear of electoral loss; the party 
could, and frequently did, rely on electoral fraud without repercussion if and when the 
need arose (Haber et al. 2008, 125).   
The courts were shackled with the same executive handcuffs in the agrarian 
sector.  Mexico’s revolution revolved in large part around the equitable redistribution of 
land that had become increasingly disparately owned by the wealthy and powerful during 
the Porfiriato, the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz from 1876-1910.  At the close of the 
revolution that overthrew Díaz, a host of inventive land reforms were instituted in the 
new constitution, including the creation of the ejido system that arranged communal 
leasing of government owned land by private citizens.  But because agrarian law was 
outside the scope of the courts’ jurisdiction, private citizens were unprotected from 
government infringements on the ejido lands they leased. 
The courts were also responsible for oversight of Mexico’s deeply valued 
Federation.  Included in the Constitution of 1917 was the specific provision for a federal 
system,19 complemented by a mandate for the courts to uphold it through checks on other 
branches and dispute mediation between government entities, called controversias 
                                                 
19 Article 40 of the Constitution of 1917. 
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constitucionales (constitutional controversies).20  Yet despite these formal powers, the 
courts lacked the clout to exercise them: “Prior to the political and judicial reforms of the 
1990s, conflicts between federal and state entities, or between different government 
agencies or officials, would be resolved behind closed doors, in the offices of the 
President. The judicial system was marginalized from these conflicts” (Zamora et al. 
2004, 282).  Once again, presidencialismo, rather than constitucionalismo 
(constitutionalism), limited judicial subject jurisdiction and curtailed the political 
relevance of the court.  In the seventy-seven years before the 1994 reform, controversias 
constitucionales was only invoked fifty-five times.  Ten years after the reform, that 
number had already increased more than ten times to over 700 filings (Zamora et al. 
2004, 275-7). 
Coupled with limited subject jurisdiction, judicial exercise of legal discretion was 
abridged during PRI rule.  This was in part a function of Mexico’s civil law tradition, in 
which only designated courts may exercise constitutional review.  Until 1994, Mexico’s 
Supreme Court was not a constitutional court (Zamora et. al 2004, 257).  Unlike its North 
American counterpart, the Mexican Supreme Court did not wield the power of judicial 
review,21 the “province…to say what the law is” in its entirety.22  Rather, its task was to 
apply the law in specific cases without considering the constitutionality or validity of the 
legal issues at bar.  Therefore, the Court could not claim to be the ultimate authority on 
the constitution.23  
                                                 
20 Article 105 of the Constitution of 1917 
21 Judicial review, mentioned above on page 6, is the right to consider legislation in light of the 
constitution and invalidate any offending law or provision.  Review is one of the hallmarks of a 
truly powerful court. 
22 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137. 
23 As noted early, the President commanded the constitutional order. 
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However, there did exist one legal mechanism by which Mexican citizens could 
challenge the constitutionality of government actions: the amparo trial.  The amparo suit 
was specifically designed to safeguard the constitutionally guaranteed individual liberties 
of Mexicans against government malfeasance.  Yet even this procedure was imperfect.  
The stringent procedural specifications and above all the poor success rate of the amparo 
suit detracted from its usefulness as a remedial legal tool.  Furthermore, amparo 
jurisdiction was severely limited, and sectors like the electoral and agrarian laws that 
were off limits in other capacities of judicial activity remained out of bounds in amparo 
jurisdiction (Fix-Fierro 1998; Finkel 2008).  Even when the Court did determine a 
constitutional breach under amparo, it had only limited latitude to rule and its decision 
applied exclusively inter partes, to the parties to the suit, and not ergo omnes, to the 
population at large.  Thus, legal remedy was provided only for the plaintiff and was not 
extrapolated to set precedent for future cases (Finkel 2008, 92).24 
 Finally, judicial attitudes were submissive to the executive and the justices 
themselves adhered to attitudes of political non-involvement.  Judges were externally 
incentivized to conform with party expectations, since the judicial profession was not 
viewed as a career within itself but rather a political stepping-stone to higher and loftier 
positions.  A judge who served the party well during his tenure as a justice could increase 




                                                 
24 Precedent could be created in one situation, when the same law was declared unconstitutional 
in five different amparo challenges. (Magaloni 2008, 188-89). 
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Implications of a Weak Court During Hegemonic Rule 
 The control and constraint of the Mexican Supreme Court by the executive was 
favorable for the hegemonic PRI regime on multiple levels.  First, it allowed the regime 
to legitimize its rule publicly under the guise of legality.  Second, the PRI could rely on a 
corrupt legal system to achieve certain goals without actually having to submit itself to 
genuine legal scrutiny (Magaloni 2008, 190; Domingo 2000, 712).  Third, while the 
Court maintained the veneer of autonomy, its lack of power prohibited it from checking 
the other branches and effecting the separation of powers embodied in the constitution of 
1917, precepts that would threaten PRI hegemony if faithfully upheld. 
 One note of import is that although the courts enjoyed little independence and 
equally meaningless political relevance, they did achieve a high level of political 
compliance, precisely due to the absence the first two principles.  That is, since the PRI 
controlled the court and its subject jurisdiction, and the regime commanded great 
compliance from all political actors top-down, court rulings were obeyed (Magaloni 
2008, 189). 
 
B.  History of the Court: Various Eras of Judicial Power (or lack thereof) 
 Much of the recent scholarship on Mexican judicialization centers on Zedillo’s 
1994 reform.  This essay is no exception.  Evidence abounds for why this moment is 
among the most significant in Mexican legal history and why it deserves such elevated 
attention.  That being said, Mexican judicialization scholarship must remain wary of 
reducing the empowerment story to a simple binary tale of pre-1994 judicial impotence 
and post-1994 judicial power.  The best variation on the binary schematic comes from 
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Mexican scholarship, which feature accounts that consider alternative narratives not 
hinging on the 1994 constitutional reforms.  Furthermore, Mexican scholars have 
pinpointed several pivotal moments in Mexico’s judicial-political history that have left 
indelible marks on the development of the country’s judicial system prior to 1994.25  Lest 
I should be guilty of exclusively employing the diametric pre- and post-1994 power 
division I have just criticized, I will use the next section to demonstrate that the ballad of 
Mexico’s pre-reform judiciary is not a single-note tune.  
There are a handful of apposite frameworks for understanding judicial evolution 
in Mexico.26  I find Cárdenas Gracia’s (2000, 173) account to be particularly instructive.  
His outline identifies six distinct chapters in the Court’s history based on the extent and 
character of judicial power from the promulgation of the 1824 Constitution to the present 
day.  These eras cover from 1824-1882, 1882-1917, 1917-1928, 1928-1944, 1944-1986, 
and 1986-present.  I will employ that framework in the following pages to demonstrate 
empirically the fluctuating, if never great, power of the Mexican Court prior to 1994. 
 
Chapter 1: 1824-1882 
The Constitution of 1824, although it was replaced twice subsequently by the 
Constitutions of 1857 and 1917, established some of the legacies of the Court that would 
carry into the 20th century and continue to impact the Court today.  The Constitution of 
                                                 
25 This may be a function of the fact that much of this scholarship was completed shortly after the 
reform and/or before the fall of the PRI, when the efficacy of the reform remained much more 
unclear than it does today. 
26 For alternative judicial power frameworks not utilized in this essay, see López Ayllón and Fix-
Fierro (2003), who see three distinct eras of judicial power from 1917-1970, 1970-1982, and 
1982-present; Ansolabehere (2007, 112) notes three periods of judicial power, from 1917-1950, 
1950-1993, and 1994-present; Fix-Fierro (1998) adopts an era structure similar to Cárdenas 
Gracia with some slight changes: 1917-1928, 1928-1968, 1968-1987, and 1987-present. 
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1824 established a Court that was essentially an appellate court without the political 
relevance to decide either matters of constitutionality or to mediate intergovernmental 
disputes (Cárdenas Gracia 2000, 174).  As elucidated previously, it was exactly the 
deficiency of these two abilities that would resurface after 1928 under PRI rule and 
smother the Court’s political relevance.27 
The second greatest legacy of the mid-Nineteenth Century came with the 
introduction of amparo to the federal court system in the Constitution of 1857 and the 
definition of its scope in the years that followed. During this period the Court and its 
members were faced with the opportunity to define the scope of amparo as they believed 
the language of the 1857 Constitution dictated.  But rather than read it expansively, as 
some members of the Court wished to do, the majority of the Court interpreted narrow 
application guidelines for the amparo (Cárdenas Gracia 2000, 176).  That minimalist 
approach haunts the efficacy of the amparo trial even today. 
 
Chapter 2: 1882-1917 
 This period corresponds directly with the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz and the 
Mexican Revolution that culminated in 1910 from his oppressive regime.  During the 
Porfiriato, the Court abstained from asserting itself while the executive 
unconstitutionally usurped legislative powers (Cárdenas Gracia 2000, 177).  The 
compression of the legislative and judicial powers under the office of the executive 
during the Porfiriato was Mexico’s first grave breach of the separation of powers and 
                                                 
27 It was not until the amparo suit was written into the Constitution of 1857 that the Court 
formally gained these powers (Cárdenas Gracia 2000, 174). 
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would set the stage for the PRI to follow suit less than twenty years after Díaz’s 
departure.  
These first two chapters, covering the years 1824-1917, are integral in 
understanding the genesis of phenomena that would result in judicial impotence for 
nearly the rest of the 20th century.  First, the tradition of political irrelevance was 
conceived with the very creation and institutional arrangement of the early court as an 
appeals court with limited scope—even under amparo—as opposed to an interpretive 
authority on the constitution.  Second, judicial autonomy was first compromised under 
the Díaz dictatorship.  Third, judicial preferences yielded to the consolidation of a 
Mexican juridical-legal culture embodied in the attitudes of non-interventionism in 
political issues as well as protectionism and the legitimation of the autocratic ruling 
regime. 
 
Chapter 3: 1917-1928, First Instance of Mexican Judicial Power 
In comparison with the Porfiriato, judicial power flourished in the years directly 
following the ratification of the constitution of 1917.  The drafting convention of 
Querétaro sought to empower a judiciary that had been subverted into an instrument of 
the executive—as it fatefully would be again years later—and made it part of their 
constitutional mission to bring judicial autonomy to Mexico (Fix-Zamudio 1990, 285-6). 
“The framers of the 1917 Constitution viewed a strong Supreme Court as a necessary 
element of a federal system of government” (Zamora et al. 2004, 276).  The immediate 
results were that the Supreme Court was freed from appointment by the president.  The 
original appointment procedures contained in the constitution called for each state 
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legislature to nominate a single candidate.  The aggregate list of nominations would then 
be submitted to Congress, which would conduct a secret vote to approve one candidate 
by a majority vote.  To ensure additional institutional insulation from the executive, the 
Supreme Court—not the president—was charged with the appointment of lower tier 
federal judges, a responsibility it retained until the 1994 reforms (Finkel 2008, 91).  
Although this was intended to promote judicial autonomy, Supreme Court administration 
of the federal judiciary would later serve to facilitate the PRI’s control of the legal 
system. 
In addition to early structural independence, the Court demonstrated power by 
asserting itself against other branches and political actors, something it would do little of 
in the years that followed (Domingo 2000, 710; Cárdenas 2000).  In fact, amidst early 
jurisdictional discrepancies arising from a new constitutional mandate, the Court actively 
assumed the responsibility of advancing the precepts enshrined in the new constitution, 
among them the legal protection of labor from exploitation and the faithful 
implementation of the agrarian reform (Fix-Zamudio 1990, 287-289).28 
One more boon to the courts during this initial period was that the hegemonic PRI 
regime had yet to take power and reform the political order into a smoothly functioning, 
formalistic system that could control the judiciary through both legal and extralegal 
tactics.  By all measures of independence, relevance, complicity and persistence, this was 
a period of judicial power, the first ever in Mexico’s history.  Sadly, it would also be the 
last for the next seven decades. 
 
                                                 
28 Like the Hungarian Court, the Mexican Court would later be punished by elites for its 
premature advocacy of mass interests like agrarian and labor reform.  For example, agrarian law 
would be expunged from the Court’s purview and given to the executive. 
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Chapter 4: 1928-1944 
When the PRI’s ancestor National Revolutionary Party (PNR) came to power in 
1928, the recently established judicial power immediately relapsed.  The Court suffered 
the first blows to judicial independence and experienced the beginning of “the process of 
subordination of the Court to the executive” (Domingo 2000, 712) in President Calles’ 
1928 constitutional amendment that transferred the power of judicial nomination from the 
state legislatures to the president, still contingent on simple majority approval by the 
Senado.  Notably, all sitting justices at the time of the passage of the amendment were 
replaced—a measure President Zedillo would borrow for his reforms more than sixty 
years later.   
Judicial independence endured another attack only a few years later, this time at 
the hands of President Cárdenas’ 1934 amendment that altered the life terms of federal 
justices to sexenios, six-year terms that coincided with president’s tenure (Domingo 
2000, 712).  The end of life term limits destroyed judicial insulation and politicized the 
judicial profession by making it a political stepping-stone rather than a career within 
itself.29   
Finally, the Court’s political relevance dwindled during this period.  Substantive 
judicial power was abridged with the 1931 removal of agrarian law from the scope of 
justiciable issues under the amparo trial.  Jurisdiction over agrarian law was only 
returned to the courts in 1992 by constitutional amendment (Fix-Zamudio 1994, 290). 
 
 
                                                 
29 However, the lack of judicial insulation in this regard was relatively short-lived.  Life term 
limits for federal justices were restored by constitutional amendment in 1944 (Cárdenas Gracia, 
180). 
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Chapter 5: 1944-1986 
The period from 1944-1986 was marked by reforms that reshuffled the internal 
administrative responsibilities of the Court.  In 1944, Supreme Court judges regained 
their life tenure that had been limited to just six years in 1934.  In 1951, constitutional 
reform created additional sub-national courts to decentralize the federal judicial power in 
order to help dissolve the overwhelming caseload pressuring the Supreme Court.  
Amparo jurisdiction was given to these new courts.  Subsequent reform in 1968 further 
diminished the Supreme Court’s crowded docket, inching closer to a constitutional court 
(Cárdenas Gracia 2000, 182).  Despite these progressive steps towards a more effective 
judicial system, the Court still did not enjoy sufficient autonomy or relevance to manifest 
true power. 
 
Chapter 6: 1986-Present 
 The reform of 1987 had two major effects.  It raised the political relevance of the 
sub-national courts and increased the administrative power of the Supreme Court.  The 
lower circuit courts were assigned the power of amparo jurisdiction, with the Supreme 
Court reserving the power to reconcile any amparo discrepancies that arose between 
various courts on the lower levels.  On the administrative end, the Court gained the power 
to create new lower courts (Fix-Fierro 1998, 5-6). 
 
What This Framework Shows Us 
The various periods of Supreme Court history demonstrate that, while judicial 
power was stifled for most of the Porfiriato and PRI rule, there were fluctuating levels of 
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power at various points during those regimes, including a brief epoch of real judicial 
power from 1917-1928.  This framework also shows that the causes and factors of 
judicial constraint date back to 1824, over a century before the PRI rose to power.  
Furthermore, this schematic highlights an effort to change the Court through the canon of 
constitutional reforms.  The Court moved incrementally closer to a higher-functioning, 
constitutional court through reforms that aimed to disperse its bureaucratic 
responsibilities and alleviate its overflowing docket. 
These alternative classifications of power are instructive because they help us 
understand that judicial power in Mexico during the 20th century was not a one-note tune. 
I still see a critical division at the year 1994 because it represents the true empowerment 
moment.30  Exploration of the era from 1994-present is important because it allows us to 
treat the crucial questions: “Is it real power? If so, is it maintaining over time?” 
 
C. The 1980s and the Deterioration of PRI Hegemonic Domination  
 The National Revolutionary Party (PRN) took power in 1929 at the close of the 
Mexican Revolution and the series of bloody civil wars that followed it.  Ultimately 
changing its name to the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in 1946, the party 
continued its rule well into the 1990s, when it experienced a series of electoral losses that 
culminated in the presidential election of opposition National Action Party (PAN) 
candidate Vincente Fox Quesada in 2000 (Finkel 2008, 90; Magaloni 2008, 182).  The 
                                                 
30 There is a notion that the 1987 constitutional amendment could be considered the 
empowerment moment—and the 1994 amendment a mere follow-up measure—because it aimed 
to free the court of its extraneous responsibilities to make it a constitutional court.  However, the 
scope of the Court’s constitutional activity was still too limited and its autonomy still too dubious 
at that point to consider it empowered under my power definition. 
 
 42 
PRI’s 71-year reign was marked by fraudulent elections, party-controlled politics, and 
little institutional independence.  So what precipitated the PRI’s fall from power? 
Mexico experienced an economic crisis in the 1980s that would shake the PRI and 
usher in its demise.31  In 1982, outgoing president José López Portillo (1976-1982) 
privatized the banks, beginning a trend among the next PRI presidents of implementing 
unpopular neo-liberal economic initiatives that later ruptured the economy.  PRI 
presidential successor Miguel de la Madrid (1982-88) inherited the extremely precarious 
position of dealing with a fleeing electorate and a bleeding economy, both of which only 
continued to deteriorate over time (Gonzalez 2008, 179). “Traditionally, the PRI had used 
economic growth to legitimate its rule and obtains votes” (Finkel 2008, 103).  So when 
the financial crisis arrived and the regime could no longer hang its hat on economic 
prosperity, it panicked and initiated a liberalizing economic transition away from 
expansive government control of the financial sector.   
At the same time, in an effort to minimize the anticipated electoral loss in the 
upcoming elections, the de la Madrid administration implemented more pro-party 
electoral legislation.  The 1987 electoral code—conveniently promulgated at the end of 
de la Madrid’s sexenio and right before the 1988 presidential elections—included 
provisions that hampered new political party formation, changed the voting procedure to 
favor PRI representation at the expense of PAN and the Party of the Democratic 
Revolution (PRD), and ensured PRI’s majority position in Congress through the 
infamous “governability clause” that awarded the party with the highest proportional vote 
51% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies even if it accrued less than 50% of the vote.  
                                                 
31 Mexico would experience another economic crisis under Zedillo in 1994, dubbed the Peso 
Crisis. 
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This was a clear deviation from the past three PRI administrations’ agenda of liberal 
electoral reform and a sign that the PRI was now willing to sacrifice democratic 
legitimacy for formal power (Haber et al., 131).   
As expected, the PRI took a huge hit in the 1988 presidential election.  PRI 
candidate Carlos Salinas defeated National Democratic Front (FDN) candidate and 
former PRI defector Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas with a slim majority of 51.7%, thanks in part 
to an election night computer “malfunction” in the ballot-counting machines that earned 
the election the distinction of being the most corrupt in Mexican history (Haber et al., 
132-3).  In the immediate wake of the election, the PRI had succeeded in that they 
managed to save the presidency.  But the party’s use of fraud and disregard for electoral 
legitimacy outraged the public and would provoke future electoral backlash, resulting just 
the next year in the first PRI gubernatorial defeat in Baja California by the primary 
opposition PAN. 
 After the debacle of the 1988 presidential election, the regime responded to 
domestic pressure by creating legitimate electoral agencies to reinstitute a veneer of 
democratic legitimacy.  Thus, the Federal Electoral Institution (IFE) was born to oversee 
elections.  For the first time, oversight of elections in Mexico would not be handled by 
the party but by an independent entity (Haber et al., 135).  When the 1994 presidential 
election came around, it seemed the PRI’s political opening strategy would pay 
dividends.  PRI candidate Ernesto Zedillo claimed victory in a relatively “clean” election.  
But the victory was still not enough; the PRI—experiencing its own internal 
fragmentation—turned to judicial reform. 
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D. Zedillo and the 1994 Reforms 
 Zedillo’s 1994 constitutional amendments transformed the Mexican judiciary 
from an executive puppet devoid of political significance into an autonomous 
constitutional court.  This was accomplished through a wholesale renovation of the 
judicial system that restored to it in full the two judicial power criteria that had made 
fleeting cameos at other points in its history: independence and political relevance.32 
 
Judicial Independence Through Structural Reform 
Zedillo introduced independence to the Mexican judiciary for the first time since 
1928 through structural changes to the Supreme Court as well as with the creation of an 
autonomous judicial agency that would accept the administrative responsibilities 
previously assigned to the Supreme Court, the Federal Judicial Council (Consejo Federal 
Judicial, CFJ).  The reforms changed many of the structural aspects of the Supreme Court 
that prevented the development of a strong judicial profession.  To begin, a higher degree 
of professionalism was required to become a Supreme Court justice.  Nominees now 
required 10 years of experience as an attorney and two years of residency in Mexico 
immediately prior to nomination.  Similarly, stipulations were made to weed out political 
cronyism and incompetence.  Supreme Court justices could no longer be nominated after 
the age of 65 or have held an elected political office (except as president of the 
Federation) in the year before nomination.  Next was a change to the contemporary 
culture of the court.  The sitting banc of 26 judges was completely removed and replaced 
with 11 new justices, cutting the court’s membership to less than half of its formerly 
                                                 
32 At the empowerment moment it is impossible for a court to possess the other two critical 
criteria, compliance from other political actors and maintenance over time. 
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cumbersome body.  Finally, the life terms of the justices were reduced to 15 years with 
staggered appointment every two years (Ansolabehere 2007, 117).  Additionally, the 
nomination procedure was altered to give the president and party less power.  The new 
reform called for the president to submit a list of three candidates to the Senado, which 
would then select one and submit him to a confirmation vote requiring a two-thirds 
supermajority rather than the old standard of a simple majority (Domingo 2005, 9). 
The 1994 reform forged independence on the sub-national levels and within the 
judicial profession.  Zedillo created a new agency, the Federal Judicial Council (CFJ), 
which benefitted the judicial system in two distinct ways.  First, the CFJ inherited most of 
the administrative functions of the Supreme Court.  Until the reform, the Supreme Court 
was responsible for the appointment of lower federal judges and the organization of the 
entire federal judicial order.  The transfer of these responsibilities to the CFJ helped to 
alleviate the pressure on the Supreme Court, whose procedural and administrative duties 
had perpetually detracted from the number of cases it could hear.  The CFJ’s handling of 
the judicial administrative power permitted the restructured Supreme Court, with fewer 
members after the reduction, to focus on its newly granted constitutional responsibilities 
(Ansolabehere 2007; 115). 
Secondly, the removal of the Supreme Court’s power to appoint lower judges 
diminished the opportunity for inter-stratum judicial collusion and corruption.  The High 
Court no longer possesses the power to structure the entire judicial profession, which 
reduces the prospect for political cronyism (Zamora et al. 2004).  However, there is one 
drawback of the new appointment process.  Supreme Court judges can no longer install 
doctrinally like-minded judges.  This makes the vertical adjudication process less 
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streamlined because it replaces the doctrinal uniformity of the past with a greater 
diversity of judicial philosophies, creating the capacity for conflicting statutory 
interpretation on the lower levels.  As a result, The Supreme Court now has to expend 
greater energy resolving the conflicts stemming from the lower judicial tiers. 
 
Political Relevance Through Subject Matter Reform: 
The reform granted the Supreme Court the power of judicial review through two 
new mechanisms that would finally wrest control of the constitutional order away from 
the president and place it in the hands of the courts for the first time in the history of the 
Federation.  These procedures were the “constitutional controversies” and 
“unconstitutionality of laws.”   
 The constitutional controversies clause allows the court to mediate disputes 
between public officials and entities.  The Court may now hear challenges brought by 
public ministers against states, a state against another state, a state against the federation, 
or between branches.  The implications of this provision were great; it resulted in checks 
and balances and the guardianship of the federal system.  Prior to 1994 controversias 
constitutcionales did exist, but that power was severely limited by inter partes 
application.  Like the amparo, the holding in a controversias constitucionales case had 
narrow implications and could not serve as future precedent (Finkel 2008, 96).  The 
reform expanded the controversias constitucionales to apply ergo omnes.  Additionally, 
controversias constitucionales was infrequently invoked.  In the seventy-seven years 
before the 1994 reform, the mechanism was only used fifty-five times.  Ten years after 
the reform, that number had already increased more than ten times to over 700 filings 
 47 
(Zamora et al. 2004, 275-7).  “[T]he dramatic increase in the numbers of constitutional 
controversies that have been taken up in the 1990s has led to the Supreme Court 
becoming a key actor in the complex redefinition of federalism that is part of Mexico’s 
political transition towards democratic rule” (Domingo 2004, 11; Berruecos 2002). 
The unconstitutionality of laws clause effectively made the Supreme Court a 
constitutional court with the power of constitutional review.  In the current Mexican 
system, a constitutional challenge may be brought by an individual (concrete review) or 
by a one-third vote of the legislative chamber on a law it proposed and passed.  
Originally, Zedillo had stipulated that a challenge brought by either one of the houses of 
Congress required a 45% near-majority vote, but the revised version of the bill reduced 
that number to one-third, welcoming more challenges (Finkel 2008, 96). 
 
The PRI’s Strategy: Restrictions on Judicial Power 
 Despite the historic empowerment implications of the 1994 reform, Zedillo was 
careful to protect the PRI by inserting key institutional safeguards that would limit the 
new powers of the Supreme Court.  The new Court could not apply the 
unconstitutionality of laws to electoral laws (which could further challenge the PRI’s 
hegemony); eight of the eleven Supreme Court justices had to agree on the 
unconstitutionality of a law to invalidate it rather than a simple majority of six; and 
constitutional challenges had to be filed no later than one month after the promulgation of 
legislation (Finkel 2008, 97).  All of these provisions placed a higher burden on the Court 
in invalidating legislation and challenging PRI dominance. 
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E. Explaining Mexico’s Judicial Empowerment Moment 
Mexico’s momentous 1994 constitutional revolution occurred as the necessary 
result of Mexico’s simultaneous transitions towards economic liberalization and political 
democratization.  The sudden propulsion of judicial power in Mexico stemmed from a 
diffusion of power created by a democratization process that, while slow and incremental, 
eventually toppled the 71-year hegemonic authoritarian rule of the PRI.  This diffusion of 
power was manifested in 1) the rise of opposition parties and a competitive multi-party 
system through electoral reform, 2) an ideological schism within the PRI, 3) delegation of 
executive power to independent agencies like the IFE, 4) the decline of presidencialismo 
and the resulting adoption of constitucionalismo, and 5) the opening of the media from 
being exclusively party-controlled to opposition accessible. 
Judicialization in Mexico resulted from a slow and incremental transformation 
from a closed authoritarian state to a more liberal democracy33.  This maturation was 
precipitated by two major changes that arose in the 1980s.  First, economic failures 
required an evolution from a corporativist to a neo-liberal state and played a part in 
decentralizing economic power.  Second, the democratization process catalyzed perhaps 
the chief factor in establishing judicial power: diffusion of political power.34   
Zamora et al. (2004, 161) posit that “The strengthening of election laws and the 
decline of centralized economic power as a result of neo-liberal reforms served to reduce 
                                                 
33 Granted, Mexico continues to be haunted by its authoritarian legacy, inhibiting its progress 
towards a full liberal democracy.  Perhaps the chief impediment is an aversion to the rule of law, 
which, as Ayllón and Fix-Fierro (2003, 286) write, faces such mitigating factors as “poverty and 
the unequal distribution of wealth, environmental degradation, migration, social exclusion and 
violence, drug trafficking and organized crime, corruption, unemployment, [and] regional 
imbalances.” 
34 “The government encouraged [economic liberalization] while at the same time imposing a tight 
and centralized process of selective political opening” (Gonzalez, 179).  
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the power of the Mexican presidency.”  I concur and believe that it also caused judicial 
empowerment in Mexico.  The decline of presidencialismo was imperative to the 
establishment of judicial power because its demise ushered in the arrival of 
constitutionalism (Ansolabhere, 115).  In the era of presidencialismo, the constitution 
was malleable and the constitutional order was directly subjected to the president’s 
whims.  But the successful alternation of power from PRI president Zedillo to PAN 
president Fox signaled that, from then on, every political party and president would be 
bound by the constitution. 
Current scholarship has developed two main competing explanations for the 
empowerment moment: political insurance and regime-legitimation.  I believe both of 
these hypothesis are encapsulated by my own, that Mexico’s judicial empowerment 
resulted from its economic and political transitions. Domingo (2005) supports this notion, 
attributing Mexican judicialization to modernization and democratization.  As Mexico 
liberalized and democratized, the PRI was forced to explore both the options of political 
insurance and regime-legitimation 
  Similar to Hirschl’s elite hypothesis, the political insurance hypothesis describes 
judicial empowerment as part of the strategic planning of a regime that anticipates losing 
power due to waning electoral certainty (Ginsburg 2003, Finkel 2008).  Regimes that fear 
their downfall in the majoritarian institutions, like the executive and legislative branches, 
may opt to empower the judiciary to insulate their agenda from the public after they 
suffer electoral defeat.  Conversely, legitimation is an attempt by the regime to maintain 
power by placating public demands for genuine legal norms.  Both domestic and 
international pressure to legitimize the regime caused the PRI to adopt electoral reforms, 
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particularly after the 1988 election debacle.  Despite remnant pro-party electoral 
mechanisms, the reform gave way to a political opening by providing a discontent polity 
the tools necessary to voice its qualms in the polls.  With electoral losses accumulating on 
all levels, the PRI sensed the need for safeguards in case it were to finally fall from 
power.   
Inclán (2009, 2007) has argued that Zedillo’s timing in introducing judicial 
reform—soon after his inauguration—does not fit with the political insurance model 
because the PRI had just won the presidential election.  However, to pass a constitutional 
amendment, Zedillo required two-thirds support of both houses.  While the 1994 
presidential election resulted in success for the PRI with the election of Zedillo (albeit 
with a plurality win with less than 50% of the vote), the PRI did not have as much 
success in the congressional election, maintaining two-thirds in the Senate but only a bare 
majority in the lower Chamber of Deputies.  Thus, in order to promulgate the legislation, 
Zedillo’s PRI required a coalition effort from one of the other major parties.  As part of 
the party’s anti-PRI stance, the PRD had made it clear they would not support the 
amendments (Haber et al. 2008).  That left the PRI with only PAN as a possible coalition 
partner.  This empowered the PAN, who was able to push for some concessions from the 
PRI in exchange for cooperation in the Chamber of Deputies.  Another challenge was that 
Zedillo needed to pass the legislation before the 1997 midterm elections, when the 
possibility of losing even more seats in the congressional houses could submarine his 
reform efforts.  Accordingly, Zedillo had less than two years to draft his reform 
legislation, recruit an opposition party for his coalition, and engage in the bargaining 
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process about the details of the legislation.  With all these obstacles, it is no wonder the 
Zedillo administration made the judicial reform of 1994 one of its first priorities. 
Another explanation for judicialization in Mexico is the development of a true 
federal system.  Shapiro (1981) has linked judicialization to federalism and the need for a 
third party arbiter to resolve dispute between various levels of government.  Mexico is 
divided into 32 districts, each with its own governor.  Prior to 1989, the PRI perennially 
controlled each district, winning every gubernatorial race and maintaining majorities in 
the state legislatures.  During that time, governors acted as parochial servants of the 
national party, working to pursue the party’s goals on the state level (Magaloni 2008, 
189).  But in 1989, the PRI lost its first gubernatorial race to the PAN in the district of 
Baja California, followed by two more gubernatorial losses before 1994.  While three out 
of thirty-two is a far cry from a majority, the growing cadre of opposition party governors 
leading states constituted a very real threat to PRI hegemony.  One of the central 
implications of the 1994 reform was that the federal judiciary would now be able to hear 
disputes brought between levels of the federation—exactly as Shapiro asserts.   
When all the governors were members of the PRI, there was little chance that a 
state would bring suit against the nation for two reasons.  First, it was unlikely that the 
governor’s interest deviated from the national party’s agenda because, just as the 
president controlled the national party, the national party controlled the local governors.  
Second, if a problem did arise, it could be mediated within the party without the use of 
external arbiters: “Prior to the political and judicial reforms of the 1990s, conflicts [of 
federalism] would be resolved behind closed doors, in the offices of the President. The 
judicial system was marginalized from these conflicts” (Zamora et al. 2004, 282).  
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Therefore, there was little need for or use of an inter-level arbiter.  As power diffused 
across federal levels and the PRI began losing key districts, there finally became a need 
for an independent, impartial arbiter to mediate disputes. 
 Gonzalez (2008) asserts that the 1994 reform was promulgated as a result 
of President Zedillo’s personal political preferences.  He believes Zedillo deviated from 
traditional PRI party politics and took office with the intention of initiating a political 
opening that would make Mexico a true free-market democracy.  Accordingly, Zedillo 
empowered the judiciary in order to strengthen the rule of law, a necessary component of 
the democratic and liberal transition (Moustafa 2008; Hirschl 2004).  However, the 
notion that Zedillo sought judicialization for personal reasons is flawed because Congress 
included many obstacles to achieving complete judicial power.35  Not to mention, many 
of these restrictions were even more stringent in the original version of the reform bill but 
were scaled back during Congressional deliberation.  Among other provisions, Zedillo 
proposed more presidential involvement in the appointment process, a greater percentage 
of Congress to question the constitutionality of a law, a greater number of justices 
required to invalidate a law, and a limited window of time to constitutionally challenge 
legislation.  That is to say, Zedillo empowered the judiciary, but tried to do so with a 
great number of impediments to swift and sweeping change.  Finally, Zedillo prohibited 
electoral laws from the scope of Supreme Court review, denied ex post facto review of 
laws already in effect, and appointed all eleven of the new Supreme Court justices that 
took the bench in 1994. 
 
                                                 
35 See pages 47 and 64 for more on these restrictions. 
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F.  Post-1994 Judicial Power: More Reforms 
 If the 1994 reforms are to be considered the empowerment moment, the reforms 
of 1996 and 1999—once again initiated by President Zedillo—can be said to have 
“culminated the process” of Mexican judicialization (Haber et al. 2008, 142). 
 
Reform of 1996 
The introduction of another constitutional amendment in 1996 further empowered 
the Mexican judiciary and “has significantly raised the political profile of the Supreme 
Court” (Domingo 2000, 720).  The impact of the 1996 reform can be summed up in one 
theme: electoral review.  Thanks to the reform, the Supreme Court today enjoys the 
purview of electoral laws, a luxury it never had in the past.  The Court may now apply its 
constitutionality of laws review to the electoral laws.  Additionally, the Federal Electoral 
Court was restructured, its powers augmented, and its jurisdiction expanded.  It now is 
the ultimate authority on electoral laws and may hear amparo challenges to electoral 
legislation that runs afoul of the constitution (Fix-Fierro 1998, 7). 
The 1996 reform was crucial to completing the Supreme Court’s rise in political 
relevance.  After President Salinas returned the review of agricultural law to the courts in 
1992, the electoral sphere was the last and most important area of law outside judicial 
purview.  The Court’s ability to check the electoral code practically eliminates the 




Reform of 1999 
 Just as the 1996 reforms capped the evolution of the Court’s political relevance, 
the constitutional amendment of 1999 signaled the climax of the Court’s independence.  
The 1999 reform finished the long and incremental administrative reshuffling of the 
federal judiciary that began in 1944 and capped the previous attempts to reduce the 
unbearable caseload the Supreme Court perennially faced.  The Court now has the power 
to delegate cases to lower courts, the Collegiate Circuit Courts (CCC), helping alleviate 
the overwhelming number of case submissions it receives annually (Zamora et al. 2004, 
191). 
 
G.  Assessing Judicialization in Modern Mexico: Power or Puppetry? 
 This essay has detailed the Mexican Court’s legacy of impotence prior to the 1994 
empowerment moment as well as the institutional and theoretical implications of the 
empowerment.  But in order to determine if Mexico’s courts are stronger today after the 
constitutional revolution than they were in the decades before we must examine the 
cultural and institutional factors impacting the Court’s behavior since the empowerment 
moment.  The following section outlines the cultural and institutional conditions that 
have tended to encourage judicial power since 1994. 
 
Post-2000 Diffuse Political Power: Legislative Gridlock 
 Since the election of consecutive PAN presidents Vincente Fox and Felipe 
Calderón in 2000 and 2006 respectively, Mexico has finally come to experience 
executive-legislative gridlock.  Distance from the official democratizing moment in 2000 
 55 
has seen the entrenchment of political competition and the diffusion of power across 
Mexico’s three-party system.  Currently, in the Senado, the PAN holds 39% of the seats, 
the PRI 26%, and the PRD 20%, with the remaining 15% spread across minority parties 
and independents.36  In the Chamber of Deputies, the PRI holds the most seats with 47%, 
the PAN 29%, and the PRD 14%, with the remaining 10% spread across minority 
parties.37  No one party has an absolute majority in either house, and each house is 
dominated by a different party—PAN in the Senado and PRI in the Chamber of Deputies.  
Furthermore, no one party has held the two-thirds supermajority in either of the houses 
since before the 2000 election (Haber 2008, 208).  All this points to the necessity of inter-
party coalitions and inter-branch cooperation.  The PRI’s near majority in the Chamber of 
Deputies presents a very real block to the ruling PAN’s agenda despite its consecutive 
presidential victories.  What does this all mean for judicial power?  Political 
fragmentation and a greater propensity for Supreme Court policymaking. 
 In one example, the Supreme Court ruled on behalf of President Fox in a 2005 
discrepancy between the executive and Congress over federal budget spending.  Fox 
exercised his presidential line-item veto over provisions of a federal bill engineered by 
the opposition coalition that aimed to increase federal spending on education and health 
care.  The Court issued a narrow opinion in the case, supporting Fox’s procedural right to 
veto rather than addressing the competing executive-legislative claims to federal 
budgetary authority (Haber et al. 2008, 204-5).  Regardless, the Court’s ruling had 
important national policy impacts and exemplified the growing need for the Supreme 
                                                 
36 Statistics from the official website of the Senado de la República, www.senado.gov.mx. 
37 Statistics from the official website of the Camara de Diputados, 
www3.diputados.gob.mx/camara/001_diputados/005_grupos_parlamentarios. 
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Court as a third party policymaker when the executive and legislative branches arrive at 
an impasse.38 
 
Presidential Election of 2006 
 In Mexico’s equivaled of Bush v. Gore,39 the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal 
Judicial Branch (TEPJF)—the court established by the 1999 reform specifically to 
preside over electoral law—was asked to intervene and substantiate the winner of the 
neck-and-neck 2006 presidential election between the PAN’s Felipe Calderón and the 
PRD candidate, former governor of the Distrito Federal Andrés Manuel López Obrador.40  
The TEPJF ordered a partial recount before verifying the Federal Electoral Institute’s 
initial declaration that Calderón had won by an incredible margin of .06% of the popular 
vote, defeating López Obrador 36.7% to 36.1% (Haber et al. 2008, 159).  Calderón’s 
subsequent inauguration signaled the compliance of the whole Mexican political system 
with the TEPJF’s ruling in perhaps the most controversial political moment since the 
1994 empowerment and demonstrated the integral nature of the courts in 21st century 
Mexico’s political landscape.  Furthermore, since the TEPJF is an autonomous tribunal, 
the 2006 presidential election illustrates broad compliance with a court other than the 




                                                 
38 This episode also demonstrates the Court’s necessary and successful role as the impartial third 
party mediator of governmental triadic dispute resolution essential to federalism. 
39 531 U.S. 98.  
40 A testament to the true competitiveness of the election, PRI candidate Roberto Madrazo 
Pintado came in third in the voting with 22.7%. 
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Increased Substantive Jurisdiction: Landmark Rulings 
The Mexican Court has continued to hand down rulings on a wider spectrum of 
issues, ranging from abortion to same-sex marriage to economic rights.  The Court’s 
expanding substantive docket proves the continuing rise of its political relevance as well 
as the country’s growing willingness to comply with Court rulings on a greater number of 
political topics. 
A 2009 Supreme Court ruling upheld Mexico City’s progressive abortion law 
granting free abortions to women before the twelfth week of pregnancy.  Abortion in 
Mexico, as in the U.S., is subject to state legislative discretion.  But 8 of the 11 justices 
determined that the Mexico City law does violate the constitution.  Ruling narrowly, the 
High Court neither elected to establish abortion as a constitutional right nor outlaw it 
completely.41  
Mexico celebrated its first same-sex marriages in the nation’s capitol in March 
2010 as a result of a law passed in late 2009 permitting homosexuals to marry and adopt 
children.42  The PAN attorney general, supported by President Calderón, has submitted a 
constitutional challenge of the law to the Supreme Court, arguing that same-sex marriage 
is not constitutionally permissible.43  The Court has yet to hear the petition, but the 
simple fact that the case was brought to the Court constitutes use of the Court by a 
                                                 
41 Tuckman, Jo. “Judges uphold abortion rights in Mexico City.” The Guardian. The Guardian, 9 
Aug. 2008. Web. 31 Mar. 2010. 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/29/mexico.humanrights? 
42  "5 Couples in Mexico City Inaugurate Same-sex Marriage." CNN World. CNN, 11 Mar. 2010. 
Web. 24 Mar. 2010. 
<http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/03/11/mexico.same.sex.marriage/index.html>. 
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political pressure group—in this case anti-same-sex marriage advocates—as a 
policymaking organ when it is not content with the policy of majoritarian institutions.  
Additionally, the appeal to the Supreme Court expands the breadth of its subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
The TEPJF ruled on the controversial 2006 presidential election, but the Supreme 
Court has also handed down watershed rulings on electoral law.  In 1996, the recently 
empowered Court served a blow to the PRI’s electoral fraud by ruling to allow the 
investigation of state electoral fraud by the state attorney general.  The Court followed up 
in 1998 when it unanimously struck down the PRI-favoring governability clause of the 
Quintana Roo state legislature in the Court’s first ever invalidation of an electoral law 
(Finkel 2003, 789, 793). 
In the 2005 Electricity Case, the Court exercised its power as the protector of 
federalism while simultaneously affecting state economic policy.  The Court was asked to 
rule on President Fox’s reform of a law that would have allowed the Federal Electoral 
Commission to purchase electricity from private sources rather than from the state, the 
amount of which would be subject only to executive discretion.  Mexico’s electricity 
industry is state-run; Fox’s reform was an attempt to usurp legislative power and boost 
private economic interests at the expense of the state.  The Court ruled against Fox and 
the PAN, supporting Congress’ legislative power as well as the public interest in the 
electricity industry (Magaloni 2008, 203). 
In 2007, the Court invalidated a number of provisions of the 2006 Broadcasting 
Law that would have challenged fair competition and effectively provided media 
broadcasting monopolies to the two country’s largest television networks, Televisa and 
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TV Azteca.  The ruling hinged on the justices’ belief that the law would have 
disadvantaged media development in indigenous communities, thereby violating the 2002 
indigenous-rights law.44  With this decision, the Court asserted itself not only in the name 
of just and competitive corporate practices but also on behalf of Mexico’s indigenous 
minority, merging economic and social liberalism. 
 
Judicial Rulings in Light of Regime Allegiance and Elite/Mass Considerations 
Magaloni and Sanchez (2006) have argued that the Supreme Court has ruled in 
favor of its empowering political elites, the PRI, in most challenges since the 1994 
empowerment.  That claim, if true, may not come as a surprise; PRI President Zedillo 
handpicked all 11 of the Supreme Court justices as part of the 1994 reform package.  
Pursuant to the staggered replacement criteria, the last of those judges will retire just this 
year, meaning the PRI has had judicial representation on the Court since the reform.  
Furthermore, it is worth noting that, though PRI elites empowered the Supreme Court in 
1994, the party did not fall from power until 2000. 
 However, Finkel (2003) finds the Court’s support of the PRI to be a decelerating 
trend, evidenced in part by the Court’s meaningful defiance of the PRI in two instances of 
electoral adjudications (mentioned above).  Considering the election of consecutive PAN 
presidents and the rulings in the aforementioned landmark cases,45 Finkel’s claim appears 
legitimate.  As such, the Court has demonstrated the divergence from elite support that is 
expected of maturing judiciaries. 
                                                 
44 “Supreme Court Declares Key Provisions of Broadcast Law Unconstitutional.” SourceMex 
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<http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/legal-services-litigation/5522712-1.html> 
45 Notably, many of these cases were argued after Magaloni and Sanchez wrote in 2006. 
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 Furthermore, the Court has increasingly supported mass interests over time, 
evidenced in the areas of abortion, gay, and indigenous rights discussed in the previous 
heading.  The Court’s most recent rulings have favored marginalized group interests for 
homosexuals (the right to marry, the right to adopt children), pregnant women (the right 
to abortion in the face of the historically powerful Catholic Church), and small businesses 
(the Broadcasting Ruling that defeated monopolizing big corporate stations). 
 
Increased Judicial Professionalism 
Finkel (2008, 94) argues the diffusion of power has changed the perspectives of 
the judges themselves.  Before 1994, the judicial profession and Supreme Court positions 
were used mainly as political stepping-stones to loftier positions within the party.  But the 
constitutional reforms—coupled with the shift towards legitimate electoral democracy 
and the downfall of the PRI—have changed the nature of the judicial profession.  Thanks 
to a competitive multi-party system, a judge can no longer expect the party of the 
president who appointed him to remain in power in the future.  Therefore, the judicial 
career has become a legitimate profession in and of itself, with judges aspiring to higher 
judicial posts rather than other political positions. 
 
Trending Towards a Rights-Conscious Culture 
 Individual rights and the due process of law were only nominally afforded by the 
PRI during the early and middle stages of its regime (Magaloni 2008, 190).  But 
coinciding with the political and social liberalization of the past two decades, Mexico has 
experienced the emergence of a culture with concern for rights protection.  In 1990, 
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President Salinas responded to the public outcry against Mexico’s poor human rights 
record by creating a completely independent office charged with the protection and 
oversight of national human rights, the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) 
(Gonzalez 2008, 192).  Evidence for Mexico’s rising rights culture is that the number of 
amparo petitions has steadily risen each year since 1997 (Zamora et al. 2004, 258).  This 
means more citizens are aware of their rights guarantees, are confident in the judicial 
system as a venue for remedy, and are actively pursuing the protection of their 
constitutionally promised rights. 
 
H.  Impediments to Judicial Power in the 21st Century 
 Despite all of the conditions that foment judicial power in Mexico, there are also 
many impediments to it.  Among these are an overcrowded docket, a loose rule of law, 
weak property rights, institutional restrictions on judicial activism, and the limits of the 
amparo trial as a remedy. 
 
Overcrowded Docket 
 The Mexican Supreme Court is forced to act as a court of first instance in a large 
number of cases.  Conversely, the U.S. Supreme Court has reduced the number of cases it 
“must” take each year so that it may hear the truly salient issues.  After all, the power to 
determine the legal agenda is an important aspect of judicial power.  The high number of 
reforms reshuffling the Supreme Court’s responsibilities—like the one in 1999—is an 
indicator that significant attention has been paid to the Court’s overfull docket.  While 
those reforms have certainly improved the position of the Court in terms of its caseload, 
 62 
they may not be enough.  More alterations may be required to make the Court a more 
effective tribunal.   
  
Loose Rule of Law (estado de derecho) 
When discussing Mexico’s prospect for further liberal democratic development, 
existing scholarship instinctively addresses the country’s rule of law problem.  Law 
enforcement, drug trafficking cartels, and corruption have all been identified as serious 
challenges to Mexico’s progress in fostering the rule of law (López-Ayllón and Fix-
Fierro 2003).  The rule of law deficit may be a function of cultural predilections rather 
than the legal support structure or judicial attitudes: “the bottlenecks presently facing the 
rule of law in Mexico lie less in the shortcomings of the legal infrastructure and more in 
the lack of the basic social support it requires to operate” (López-Ayllón and Fix-Fierro 
2003, 286). 
One of the greatest implications of the flimsy rule of law is the epically high rate 
of violent crime in Mexico.  Much of Mexico’s violent crime is linked to drug cartelism, 
which prevails particularly on the periphery.  One CNN report calls the border city of 
Juarez the “murder capital of the world” and the home to “the highest murder rate in the 
world.”46  Recent statistics project Mexico as the nation with the sixth highest murder 
rate in the world with more than 13 murders per 100,000 people, a number that likely 
                                                 
46 Tuchman, Gary. “The War Next Door.” CNN.  CNN Video. Web. 
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undercuts the actual murder rate due to underreported crime and the difficulties of 
measuring crime rates.47 
 
Weak Property Rights 
 Property rights in Mexico have been traditionally weak as a result of the 
historically absent rule of law and the preeminence of a monopolistic authoritarian rent-
seeking coalition (Haber et al. 2008, 210-11).  Consolidating property and economic 
rights is typically an integral part of the jurisdictional focus of newly empowered courts.  
The experience of the nascent Mexican Supreme Court has proven to be no exception, 
and property and economic rights are stronger than before.  But property rights may only 
enjoy the fullest protection if Mexico can successfully sanctify the rule of law. 
 
Restrictions on Judicial Activism 
 The stringent requirements on invalidation put a difficult burden on the Supreme 
Court for striking down laws.  Rather than a bare majority of justices, the Mexican Court 
requires the agreement of eight of the eleven justices in order to invalidate a law and set 
legal precedent.  Some of the initial restrictions Zedillo imposed on the judiciary in the 
1994 reform linger and hamper the judiciary today.  Constitutional challenges still require 
filing within one month after the promulgation of legislation.  All of these provisions 
placed a higher burden on the Court in invalidating legislation. 
 
 
                                                 
47 “"Crime Statistics Murders (per Capita) (most Recent) by Country." NationMaster.com. 
NationMaster.com. Web. 24 Mar. 2010. 
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Limitations of the amparo suit 
 The amparo suit remains limited in a number of ways.  Amparo is only invoked 
by private citizens against the government, excluding “protection against the curtailment 
of constitutional rights by important non-governmental actors in society: political parties, 
news media, private associations, labour unions, businesses, etc.” (Zamora et al. 2004, 
273).  Next, amparo is subject to many procedural limitations that cause it to be a slow, 
costly process and may preclude its use by poorer claimants.  Finally, the limited 
application of amparo decisions—still only inter partes—means that each amparo 
decision is by its nature narrow, causing courts to frequently adjudicate nearly identical 
cases, further clogging the already overloaded legal system (Zamora et al. 2004, 274). 
 
I.  Conclusion on Mexican Judicial Power 
In the past 15 years, the Mexican Supreme Court has transitioned from an 
impotent instrument of the president to a powerful constitutional tribunal.  Thanks to a 
cascade of constitutional amendments that have mostly exorcised the authoritarian legacy 
of judicial constraint, the Court today is an independent, politically relevant and 
politically complied with constitutional tribunal.  While not without significant 
impediments, judicial power has persisted for the past fifteen years in Mexico, 
entrenching itself ever more with the passage of time.  The Court has delivered 
significant rulings on a host of different political issues, constantly expanding its 
jurisdictional breadth.  Courts at the sub-national level have also evolved into entities 
with meaningful power and purview.  With any luck, Mexico will soon be able to 
overcome the few remaining obstacles preventing the country from arriving at a complete 
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